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Abstract
Children’s ability to use social information to direct their behavior is key to their survival and development. However, in
observing adult behavior, children are confronted with multiple forms of social information that may vary in reliability and
adaptiveness. Two of the most well established biases influencing human behavior are: (1) following the majority (majority
influence or conformity); and (2) the use of emotional signals. The current experiment aimed to evaluate how children
respond when both information about the majority behavior of a group (descriptive norm) and attitudes of the group
towards a behavior (injunctive norm, expressed through an emotional reaction) are present and what happens when they
are in conflict. We used a method designed to mimic the manner in which children might observe group members’
behavior during development. Novel apparatuses were constructed for which there were two discrete actions that could be
performed to retrieve a reward. Three-year-olds observed four adults demonstrating one set of actions, followed by a fifth
adult who presented an alternative set of actions. The first four adults’ injunctive responses to this fifth adult’s actions were
manipulated between-groups: positive, negative, or neutral. It was found that children preferred to copy the majority
action, regardless of the injunctive reaction of the group. We argue that this affirms the adaptive utility of copying the
majority.
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Introduction
A considerable amount of human social behavior is governed by
norms; with individuals both adhering to – and expecting others in
their group to adhere to – certain common and agreed upon
behaviors within given contexts. For instance, norms are crucial in
both social relations (e.g., shaking hands upon meeting someone
new), and in tool-use (e.g., using a knife in your right hand and
fork in your left when eating). Social psychologists have long
conceptualized norms as being able to be analyzed along two
components: (1) the frequency with which a behavior is exhibited,
and (2) the groups’ approval of that behavior [1]. That is, norms
are generally behaviors which most or all individuals do, and
which most approve of doing. Norms are increasingly being
identified as important in child development and culture [2], and
there has been recent interest in examining children’s preferential
copying of majorities of individuals [3] [4] [5]. However, the
drawing-in of norm-based theories from social psychology with
adults into developmental psychology remains in its early stages.
An important cleavage which has not yet been investigated in
children is between descriptive norms (the behavior most
individuals in a group actually do in a context), and injunctive
norms (the behavior most individuals in the group think one
should do in a context) [6]. This division between the most
exhibited actions and the expressed attitudes of a group to those
actions has been shown to help explain adult behavior (e.g., [6] [7]
[8]). Although caregivers commonly instruct children on how to
behave based on injunctive norms little is known about how
children process such information and prioritize it relative to
descriptive norms. Thus, following social psychological research
with adults, the current experiment examined how the interaction
of these two normative processes influences children’s behavior.
Given its likely importance in underpinning adults’ injunctions
witnessed by children during development, we begin by reviewing
the role adults’ emotional reactions play in children’s social
learning. We follow this by examining research into majority-
biased copying and conformity in children as it reflects research
into the effect of descriptive norms on children’s behavior.
In his concluding remarks of The Expression of the Emotions in
Man and Animals Darwin writes: ‘‘The young and the old of
widely different races, both with man and animals, express the
same state of mind by the same movements’’ ([9] p. 352). His
conjecture was that we see in humans of all cultures common
representations of emotions on the face, and that this proclivity to
show emotion by specific behaviors was shared by non-human
animals. Darwin believed emotional expressions were part of the
inheritance of the organism, a product of evolution by natural
selection.
Following Darwin, Shariff and Tracy [10] argue that emotional
expressions have evolved to communicate information about our
internal conditions, our emotional states. The first piece of
evidence Shariff and Tracy bring to bear on this claim is Ekman
and Izard’s demonstration of the cross-cultural universality of the
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understanding of facial expressions [11] (for contrasting views see
[12] [13]). Secondly, the human nervous system appears to be
designed to respond rapidly to emotional expression, with
subcortical loops recruited in response to fear expressions,
capturing attention and allowing for detailed perceptual processing
[14]. Furthermore, we see evolutionary preparedness in response
to facial expressions. Fear and anger expressions are more easily
paired with aversive stimuli than expressions of positivity – threat
signals and actual threats condition together rapidly [15].
Emotional expression and recognition reliably develop in all
non-disordered children in all cultures.
If emotional expressions have evolved to signal information,
when do children first begin to interpret these expressions and use
them to inform their behavior? Montague and Walker-Andrews
[16] showed that 4-month-old infants could already decipher facial
expressions (happiness, anger, sadness and fear), and, in a twin-
study with 5-year-olds, Elam, Carlson, DiLalla and Reinke [17]
showed that the ability to direct attention to faces had a significant
genetic component. Congruently, research into infant social
referencing has shown directly that children use the emotional
reactions of adults to inform their own behavior. By 12 months
infants can use emotional signals to regulate their actions [18], and
are also able to interpret others’ actions in light of the emotions
they express [19].
Repacholi and Meltzoff [20] give perhaps the most persuasive
demonstration of infants’ use of adults’ emotional signals in social
learning. They showed that 18-month-olds ‘emotionally eaves-
drop’: In other words, they learn from incidental observations of
adult emotion, and adjust the behaviors they imitate accordingly.
In Repacholi and Meltzoff’s study, an adult performed an object-
directed action (e.g., pulling a toy dumbbell apart) that was
followed by another adult acting either neutrally or angrily
towards the demonstrating adult. Children imitated the target
action at lower levels if the target action had been previously met
with anger – so long as the reacting adult could see what the child
was doing. This built on prior research showing that infants will
adjust their interaction with objects depending on the emotional
reactions of a model using the object [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26],
providing good evidence that children use the emotional
expressions of adults to guide their own behavior. It has been
further proposed that the negative emotional expressions of adults
may be especially strong in influencing children’s behavior because
of the potentially higher evolutionary costs of the information they
express [27].
We know from classic demonstrations [28] [29] that copying the
majority is a further powerful psychological bias in humans.
People have a strong preference to copy the behavior of others,
even against the evidence of their own perception (for a review see
[30]). This too is plausibly an evolutionarily prepared bias: copying
others leads to liking, to social acceptance [31] [32]. However, it
has also been demonstrated that copying others’ behavior will tend
to produce the optimal behavior in a given context, and therefore
maximize fitness to the individual, under quite a staggering range
of conditions [33] [34]. Many authors have suggested that much of
the research into majority influence and conformity in both
humans and animals is explicable in terms of these two
motivations: increasing social acceptance and behaving in accord
with reliable information [3] [4] [5] [35].
Recently, evidence has emerged that children also appear to be
prolific in copying the majority. Haun and colleagues [4] draw
attention to a distinction between instance of ‘‘majority influence’’
where individuals copy the most frequent behavior, and ‘‘confor-
mity’’ where it is demonstrated that the individual is changing
from their preference to adhere to the preference of the majority;
we bear this distinction in mind while discussing the following
literature. Corriveau and Harris [36] had three adult models all
simultaneously incorrectly identify which of three lines matched a
fourth, and found that three- and four-year olds made similar
responses to Asch’s adults: that is, they identified a clearly different
line as matching the target. In an earlier study, Walker and
Andrade [37] also employed an analogue of Asch’s paradigm with
adult models presenting incorrect judgments in serial, with 3 to 17
year olds exhibiting a strong tendency for conformity. Haun and
Tomasello [38] found similar evidence for conformity in which
children compared the size of drawings of animals. Corriveau,
Kim, Song and Harris [39] in a line judgment task with 3- and 4-
year-olds found that Asian-American children showed greater
conformity to the majority than Caucasian-American children.
Haun, Rekers, and Tomasello [40] demonstrated that both two-
year-olds and chimpanzees (but not orangutans) will preferentially
copy behaviors performed by a majority (demonstrating majority
influence). That is, in order to receive a reward they will
preferentially choose to drop balls into a box selected by three
role models once over an alternative box chosen by one role model
three times. Corriveau, Fusaro, and Harris [41] found young
children preferred to endorse information given by an individual
whose choices matched the majority, rather than a dissenter. And
Seston and Kelemen [42] showed analogous effects within the
object function domain: children preferring to match the object
functions given by majority members demonstrating a consensus.
This research examining conformity and majority influence in
children comes not only off the back of research with adults, but
also from research showing children’s profound proclivity to
reproduce the actions of adults [5]. The most powerful demon-
stration of this proclivity comes from work on the overimitation
effect [43] [44] [45]. In a landmark study, Horner and Whiten
[46] modeled to both young children and chimpanzees a set of
actions by which a reward could be retrieved from two identical
apparatuses. The actions and the apparatuses were identical,
except one apparatus was opaque and the other transparent.
When the experimenter modeled the actions on the transparent
apparatus it was apparent that some of the actions used were in
fact redundant. Children and chimpanzees copied all of the
demonstrated actions on the opaque box. However when
presented with the transparent apparatus the chimpanzees
jettisoned the redundant actions. In contrast, human children
copied the sequence of actions with high fidelity across appara-
tuses. The overimitation effect has been shown to be robust [44], a
likely human universal [47][48], and performed at increasingly
higher rates with age, even into adulthood [49] [50].
There has been much debate about the adaptive value of
overimitation and children’s penchant for high-fidelity copying in
general. Complicating this debate is the finding that children will,
under certain circumstances, ‘rationally’ imitate, omitting redun-
dant actions when there is a logical reason to [51], yet in other
cases will perform redundant actions even when instructed and
incentivised not to [44]. This balance, however, appears to shift
through the third year from an inclination to imitate rationally to
an inclination to overimitate [52]. Over and Carpenter [5] have
recently attempted to resolve this rational imitation-overimitation
paradox by suggesting research into infant social learning be
placed in the context of social psychological research into
conformity/majority influence with adults. They argue that the
same two biases underpin conformity/majority influence and
imitation: (1) an interpersonal function increasing liking and
affiliation [53], and (2) an accuracy function, facilitating learning
about what are the most effective behaviors in a given situation.
This mirrors earlier claims by Uzgiris [54] about the dual roles of
Groups’ Actions Trump Injunctive Reaction in Young Children
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imitation and the motivations underpinning conformity/majority
influence by Claidie`re and Whiten [3], and others [5] [35]. Over
and Carpenter [5] suggest that in both majority influence/
conformity research and in overimitaiton/imitation research
individuals are copying not just to gain useful information but to
transmit the message ‘‘we are alike’’. Over and Carpenter [5]
further argue that overimitation, and differences between contexts
when children overimitate, can be explained by reference to:
(1) the child’s own goals (to learn or to increase social affiliation) in
the situation; (2) the child’s social identification with the model;
and (3) the social pressures of the imitative situation. In this way
research into imitation and overimitation can be seen as a
demonstration of a powerful bias in children for copying the
behavior of adults, which is on a continuum with copying the
behavior of a group of adults – what is more traditionally labeled
as ‘conformity’ or majority influence.
We see in children a strong bias for copying the behavior of a
majority of adults as well as a strong bias for basing behavior on
adults’ emotional and injunctive reactions towards behaviors.
Within social psychological research conducted with adults, how
the group perceives actions as wrong or right, and the behaviors
the majority performs have both been thought to be important in
influencing the actions group members adopt [35]. In the theory of
planned behavior [55], the subjective norm – the amount of social
pressure perceived by the individual to perform a behavior – was
postulated to be a powerful force in influencing attitudes and
behavior. Yet, due to repeated demonstrations of the weakness of
subjective norms in driving behavior [56], this was reconceptu-
alized into two distinct constructs: the descriptive norm and the
injunctive norm. The descriptive norm refers to behavior most
people in a group perform, whereas the injunctive norm refers to
the behaviors most people in a group feel should be performed:
That is, the right way to act. For instance, the injunctive norm
might be that littering is wrong and that you should throw your
rubbish in the bin; however, the descriptive norm may be that in
fact most people in a given context (e.g., in a movie theatre) litter.
There is evidence that in adults a preference to adhere to
injunctive norms over descriptive norms [57].
The current experiment was designed to examine how both the
bias to copy what most do, and what most think one should do,
may differentially influence children’s imitative choices. During
development, children can be exposed to both sources of
information: the injunctive reactions of their group members
towards behavior (most saliently underpinned by emotional
reactions), and the behavior most people are using. We wanted
to know whether one source of information is privileged over the
other. In the current experiment we thus set up opposing
hypotheses to examine the relative influence of these biases.
Here children were exposed to apparatuses for which there were
two discrete ways of retrieving a toy reward. Children observed
four models opening the apparatus with one method, then a fifth
model opening the apparatus with an alternative method. To
create an injunctive norm towards a behavior, the emotional
reaction, gesture and comments, of the first four models to the fifth
model’s action was varied: being either positive, negative or
neutral. This design allowed us to compare the effect of majority
influence with the effects of the normative injunctive reaction of a
group towards a behavior (see Figure 1). Specifically, this design
allowed us to look at how the groups’ injunctive reaction towards a
behavior may influence social learning more than just their
performance of that behavior. It was also selected to attempt to
mirror the social learning experience children go through in
development, where they may see group members performing a
behavior, but also violations of this normative behavior, which
carry disapproval or approbation by the group. If children’s
imitation is more strongly influenced by the injunctive norm we
would expect (a) variation in imitation based on the valence of the
group. Namely, that children would imitate the lone individual
model’s behavior in accord with the groups’ injunctive reaction:
increasing their imitation of the lone-models’ behavior in the
positive condition relative to their imitation of her behavior in the
negative condition. Conversely, if a copy the majority or
‘descriptive norm’ bias predominates, then we should expect
(b) to find children preferring to copy the behavior used by the
group at a significantly higher rate than the behavior modeled by
the individual; with a preference for the descriptive norm over the
injunctive norm would be shown if this effect extended across
injunctive valence conditions. We also included a control
condition in which the number of demonstrations were the same
for both group and individual, which affords insight into the
influence of demonstration frequency.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Research conducted after approval and under the supervision of
The University of Queensland, adhering to Australian and
International standards for conducting research with humans.
Written consent was attained from parents/guardians/next of kin/
caretakers for the participation of their child, who was also present
throughout all testing.
Participants
Fifty-two children participated in this research. Eight children
were omitted from analyses due to parental interference (e.g.,
providing explicit instruction to the child on what to do), thus the
final sample contained 25 boys and 19 girls, aged between 2.83
and 3.34 years (M=3.08, SD= .13; N=44, n=11 per condition).
Two- to three-year-old children were selected as this age group has
generally been the youngest tested in comparable previous
experiments (e.g. [36]). Children were recruited through a
database of parents who had previously indicated willingness to
have their children participate in research.
Materials
Children in each condition viewed demonstrations on three
novel apparatuses, each of which had two discrete methods to
retrieve a toy (see Figure 2). The order of presentation of these
apparatuses was counterbalanced across participants. Using a
range of apparatuses requiring distinct action sequences and for
which the reward toys were different, removed the possibility that
the results found could be attributed to the properties of any one
apparatus. The adult models (2 male, 3 female) were presented via
DVD on a large color flat-panel television.
Procedure
To allow coding of behavior the children were videotaped. In
establishing the preferred action of the group, and the group
members’ injunctive reaction towards an alternate behavior, all
children were exposed to a series of videos of adults performing
actions on the novel apparatuses. Videos began with the five
models standing behind a table, where the first apparatus was
placed. Going from right to left, the first four models stepped
forward individually, opened the apparatus and, one after another,
extracted the toy using the majority action. The fifth model then
stepped forward and extracted the toy from the apparatus using
the alternative action sequence. Models’ responses to retrieving the
toy were kept constant: All looked happy to retrieve the toy, briefly
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playing with it, then holding it towards the camera to make it
salient. The reaction of the group to the lone model’s action varied
between-subjects by condition as described below. The video of
the lone model’s actions and the response of the group was played
twice – thus in the injunctive reaction conditions there was one
presentation of each of the four group members using one action
sequence versus two presentations of the lone model’s action
sequence. This approach was taken in order to emphasize the
group behavior as the majority approach. Nonetheless, to account
for the possibility that children’s use of the group action may not
be due to conformity but rather to greater number of presenta-
tions, we also included a control condition in which the first three
group members were shown performing the majority action
followed by three repetitions of the lone model’s action sequence
(i.e., there were 3 presentations of each of the majority and
minority actions).
Given previous literature revealing a strong bias in children to
copy adults, especially in groups [40] [41], we wanted to provide
an added incentive for children to copy the behavior of the lone
model. Thus the two actions used to extract the reward toy varied.
The action used by the group took longer to complete and
incorporated causally inefficient actions, and the action used by
the single member was quicker and more causally efficient (across
the apparatuses, the former taking an average of 3.6 times longer
for the adults model to achieve).
Before testing began, children were settled in a playroom. When
children appeared relaxed, they, along with their parent and
experimenter, entered the testing room. Children sat in front of
the television screen, within arm’s reach of their parents. They
were directed to look at (but not touch) the first apparatus, which
was placed on a table behind them. Children’s attention was
drawn to the apparatus prior to the demonstrations being
presented in order to reinforce the value of watching the television.
The experimenter said: ‘‘Alright you see what we have on the table
here… Well we’re going to watch a video, and some people are
going to show you how they use it. Let’s watch!’’ After viewing,
children were presented with the first apparatus on the floor, the
experimenter saying: ‘‘Ok, now you can have a turn, you can play
with it however you like!’’ After an action on the first apparatus
had been performed, it was removed, children were re-seated and
Figure 1. Schematic of the conditions within the experiment. (a) Experimental condition: after seeing a majority of four performing an action,
saw a fifth actor performing a different action. The injunctive reaction of the group to this action varied between-subjects, being either positive,
neutral or negative. (b) Frequency control condition: children saw a majority of three individuals performing a set of action, followed by three
repetitions of the minority actions by a single individual.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107375.g001
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the same protocol was followed with the remaining two
apparatuses. Children were randomly allocated to one of the
following four conditions:
Positive response condition. As the fifth (lone) model
retrieved the toy, the four observers, each of whom had used the
same approach, smiled, nodded and offered approving vocaliza-
tions (e.g., ‘‘mmm…’’). One member of the group also stepped
forward, saying: ‘‘Yes, that’s a great way to do it!’’, and gave a
positive ‘thumbs-up’ gesture.
Negative response condition. This condition was identical
to the positive response condition except the group members
reacted to the lone model’s retrieval method by frowning, shaking
their heads, and making disapproving vocalizations (e.g., ‘‘tsk,
tsk’’). The same group member who individually responded in the
Positive condition responded here by stepping forward, saying:
‘‘No, that’s not how you do it!’’ and throwing his hands down in a
negative gesture.
Neutral response condition. This condition was run as per
the positive and negative response conditions except the group
made no response to the new action, maintained neutral
expressions throughout, and no member of the group stepped
forward to comment on the lone model’s action.
Frequency of presentation control. This condition was the
same as the Neutral response condition except the child was
shown three members of the group modeling the target actions
(instead of four members) and three repetitions of the lone
individual’s demonstration (instead of two).
The use of videotaped images of adults expressing emotion [58],
and this type of expression of emotion, gesture and language to
manipulate adult opinions of behavior [58] [59], have been shown
to be effective in previous social referencing research.
Coding
For all three apparatuses in each condition the following was
coded dichotomously.
(a) Whether the first action children attempted was that of the
majority (1) or lone model (2).
(b) If they changed their action from the majority to the lone
model’s action: yes (1), or no (2).
(c) If they change from the lone model’s action the majority’s
action: yes (1), or no (2)
(d) If they were successful in retrieving the toy: yes (1), or no (2).
(e) If the child used the groups’ action at all during the trial: yes
(1) or no (2).
(f) If they used lone model’s action at all during the trial: yes (1)
or no (2).
Reliability
A second coder, blind to condition, recoded a random 30% of
the videos. There was a high level of agreement between raters on
each of the imitation task variables: k=1.00, p,.001 for each
measure. Due to the high level of agreement the original coder’s
data were used for analyses.
Figure 2. The three apparatuses used, descriptions of both sets of actions used to retrieve the reward toy, and description of the
reward toys.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107375.g002
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Results
Measures were produced for key outcome variables by
compiling the binary results for each trial over three trials for
each child, giving a score out of three. Preliminary analyses failed
to reveal any effect of apparatus type or apparatus order (these
variables are not considered further), or effects of gender. Given
the relatively restricted range of scores all analyses were conducted
using parametric and non-parametric statistics. As these yielded
the same outcomes, for ease of communication, only parametric
statistics are reported here.
As can be seen in Figure 3, across all conditions as their first
action children showed a strong inclination to copy the majority,
with this effect being strongest in the Positive condition (even
though in this condition the lone individual’s behavior was
endorsed by the group) and weakest in the Frequency Control
condition. In line with this, an ANOVA with condition as a
between-participant factor was significant, F (3, 40) = 3.33,
p= .029, partial g2 = .20. Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons
indicated that the mean number of actions produced by children
in the Positive condition (M=2.91; SD= .30) was higher than
those in the Frequency Control condition (M=2.18; SD= .87;
p= .038). This difference between the Positive and Frequency
Control condition is likely driven by a slightly higher proportion of
children in the Frequency control condition opting for the lone
model’s action after seeing that demonstration three times. As the
Positive condition had (marginally) the highest level of majority
action copying, this was reflected in a significant difference
between the Positive condition and the Frequency control.
However, in pairwise follow-up tests, there was no significant
difference between Negative reaction (M=2.81; SD= .40) and the
Positive condition (p= .985), or between the Neutral reaction
control condition and the Positive condition (M=2.45; SD= .69;
p= .723), which would be indicative of an effect of the injunctive,
over descriptive norm. Consistent with this interpretation, with
regard to exhibiting the majority and minority actions at all, as is
evident in Figure 3, there were no significant differences across
conditions, F (3, 40) = 1.70, p= .182, partial g2 = .11 and F (3,
40) = 1.13, p= .348, partial g2 = .07 respectively. However,
collapsed across conditions children were significantly more likely
to produce the majority action at all (M=2.75, SD= .49) than the
minority action (M= .55, SD= .70), t(43) = 13.15, p,.001,
d=3.66.
Reflecting the low occurrence of the minority action, only 8
children switched from attempting the more difficult majority
method to the easier minority method (7 children did the opposite,
switching from the minority to the majority method). No child
switched method on more than one apparatus and the tendency to
do so was unaffected by condition, F (3, 40) = .09, p= .964, partial
g2 = .01. Notably, children competently copied the actions shown
to them (see Figure 3). That is, 32 of the 44 children tested opened
all three apparatuses, with another 11 opening two, and one child
opening one, a pattern unaffected by condition, F (3, 40) = 1.55,
p= .218, partial g2 = .10.
Discussion
The current experiment examined children’s proclivity to copy
alternative behaviors which were either descriptive norms
(performed by the majority of individuals) or injunctive norms (a
behavior receiving differing injunctive reactions by the group),
within a design which mimics the observations of adult behavior
which children receive during development. We found that the
injunctive reaction of group members to a behavior had little
impact on children’s imitation. That is, children reacted by
copying the actions demonstrated by the majority of group
members, regardless of if the actions of the minority model were
responded to by the observing group members positively, neutrally
or negatively. This suggests that the children we tested had a
strong majority bias, overcoming any tendency to adhere to the
injunctive norms expressed by the group in the actions they used.
Also, the relative efficiency and ease of the lone model’s method of
opening the apparatuses did not overcome children’s preference
for the slower and more time intensive majority actions.
Experimental evidence with adults (e.g., [28]), children (e.g.,
[39] [41]), chimpanzees [40], and fish [60] argue for the adaptive
utility of copying the majority (for a discussion see [61]). Given
group behavior typically develops out of combined individual
learning efforts it is likely to be safer, more reliable and more
productive to adopt than that of any lone response [34].
Moreover, as Chudek and Henrich [62] have argued, early
cultural learners would have faced increasing selection pressures to
adopt the majority practices of their community as coordination
with community members came to represent an ever larger
proportion of lifetime fitness.
The current results add to the growing body of evidence
showing a majority bias in social learning: In a setting where both
the attitudes and behaviors of the group are evident (i.e., their
injunctive reactions, saliently underpinned by emotion, and their
actions), children opt to imitate the behavior of the group rather
than follow their disposition towards a behavior. This is perhaps
not surprising from an evolutionarily perspective. Based on the
logic that agents do not typically perform behaviors which are
detrimental to themselves [34], the developing human should copy
the agent’s behavior because it is likely to be (a) safe, and (b)
possibly advantageous. The attitudes of the group may reflect
adaptive behavior in a less reliable manner.
It remains possible that children’s responses were being driven
by other processes that have little to do with normative or
conformist behavior. For example, adopting the group action
because it took longer to demonstrate. We are unaware of any
evidence to suggest children will prioritize copying longer or more
complicated sequences over shorter or less complicated ones (see
[63]). While the recent research of Haun and colleagues [40],
shows both human children and even chimpanzees pay special
attention and copy specifically the action of the majority of
individuals, which further makes alternative explanations based on
presentation order or length unlikely. Congruently, Nielsen and
Blank [53] presented children with two models who demonstrated
different actions on the same apparatus. They reported that
children would copy the actions of whichever model remained
with them when they were given the apparatus to explore. It was
found that the social context was key in driving children’s
behavior, and that the order in which the actions were modeled
had no impact.
It is interesting to examine the current results in light of work
into the theory of planned behavior. In the theory of planned
behavior [50] evidence has tended to suggest that injunctive norms
(what the group thinks you should do) more strongly predict
intentions to perform behaviors than descriptive norms (what the
group does; [35] [57] [64]). For example, Smith and Louis [57]
conducted two studies that examined the interactive effects of
injunctive and descriptive norms. They found injunctive norms to
be a more consistent predictor of attitudes. Thus while work with
adults has suggested a preference to perform behaviors in line with
the attitudes of the group over the majority behavior, we found
children prefer the opposite.
There are several possible explanations for this apparent but
potentially informative discrepancy. Firstly, it is possible that the
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difference in results is traceable to differences in method. Smith
and Louis [57] rely on self-report, whereas our experiment
measured actual behavior. Smith and Louis used written explicit
attitudes of the group, whereas we used behavioral and verbal
emotional reactions. Yet it is also possible that our finding
represents a pertinent developmental difference in the use of social
information between children and adults. Children, being more
vulnerable, may have a bias to use the more reliable and safer
majority-behavior channel, later switching, as development
proceeds, to the emotional valence and injunctive reaction of the
group as the preferred source of information. This presents itself as
a topic for future research.
We would not want to suggest on the basis of the current
experiment that the emotional channel, injunctive reactions or
attitudes expressed by adults are in general weak or that, under
other circumstances, they would not be preferred. For instance,
the emotional reactions of primary caregivers may be a highly
weighted source of information. Furthermore, it is possible that
emotional reactions directed at the child may cause a shift in their
preferences. It is possible that children’s disposition towards a
behavior may be changed without their tendency to adopt that
behavior being changed. Future research is needed to examine
such possibilities.
There are inherent complexities in manipulating descriptive and
injunctive norms within the same design to quantify their
respective impact (e.g., [6]), as what most do and what they think
you should do intrinsically interact, leading to issues which are
hard to avoid in any one design. Take for example a manipulation
where group members perform behaviors that they show
disapproval towards, leading to a conflict of injunctive and
descriptive norms that is not reflective of most real-world social
interaction. We must further highlight the limitations which grow
out of the inherent interactions of descriptive and injunctive norm
(especially in research with children), how the current experiment
sort to minimize the impact of these, and acknowledge the
weakness still left in the design. Unlike in research with adults
where injunctive and descriptive norms can be manipulated in
subtle and less problematic ways, either in vignettes within survey
research (e.g., [57]) or having participants make inferences from
the situation (e.g., [7]), with children it is necessary to show the
actual social interactions, as has been the precedent in previous
majority influence research (e.g., [36]). It is also much more
difficult to measure children’s evaluations or dispositions, towards
certain behaviors; where in adults you can attain ratings of their
relative evaluation of behavioral options through self-report, with
children a more common strategy is to measure behavior, inferring
that this represents the source of information they are prioritizing
(as is ubiquitous in imitation research). These methodological
constraints combine to create a situation in which (at least) two
behavioral options must be available from which you can infer
Figure 3. Means (and standard errors) across conditions for the number of apparatuses on key outcome measures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107375.g003
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which type of normative information children are prioritizing in
response to a demonstration by a group, by which action children
perform.
There are several apparent options in doing this. In the current
experiment we chose a procedure in which a group of individuals
was both performing a one set of actions, and displaying an
injunctive reaction to a further individual, who was performing a
second set of actions. This allowed us to infer the effect of the
injunctive norm by examining the rate at which the actions of the
lone individual were employed by children, compared to the
group’s actions. This design was selected for external validity,
having the virtue of establishing one group who both establishes
the descriptive norm, and provides injunctive reactions towards
the actions of another individual. This is close to the situation
children face in development where their group members will
perform actions, and display reactions towards actions of
individuals which differ from most of the groups.
Yet this design generates a complexity from the interaction of
descriptive and injunctive norms. When the group shows a
negative reaction towards the lone individual descriptive and
injunctive norms are congruent: the group performs one action,
and views negatively the use of another action. When the group
shows a positive reaction towards the lone individual descriptive
and injunctive norms conflict: the group performs one behavior,
but looks on the alternative set of actions performed by the lone
model as positive. This is more reflective of real social interaction
than the converse (where the group derides a behavior they
themselves perform), as there are many situations in which
individuals who perform behaviors different from the majority of
the group receive group approval: such as when an innovation is
found, when an individual performs exceptionally (as in sport), or
when certain roles dictate that only some group members can
perform certain actions. But even in everyday life this type of
conflict occurs, Individual’s might approve of throwing rubbish in
the garbage, even though they litter; or approve of not smoking
even though they smoke.
An issue with this procedure of manipulating injunctive and
descriptive norms with children, when only behavior is measured,
is that it leaves opaque the degree to which children positively or
negatively evaluate the actions used. For instance, in the case
where the group produces a positive reaction towards the lone
individual, we cannot asses the degree to which children evaluate
the group’s actions as positive (because they have been performed
by a majority), and the relative degree to which they evaluate the
actions of the lone individual as positive (because the group has
reacted positively towards it). This kind of psychological attribu-
tion would be commonly assessed by self-report in adults, a tool
which is problematic for children this early in development. That
is, while it is possible for individuals to evaluate both things
positively, when limited to measuring actions we can only infer
that the behavior children produced reflects a prioritization of one
form of information over another. If children in our study did
evaluate the actions of the lone model as positive, after it received
a positive reaction, it is notable that they did not employ this
evaluation in the form of any higher proportion of copying
behavior of the lone model’s behavior. It is an important avenue
for future research to (a) establish methods to examine if children’s
appraisals differ in this way, and (b), to establish if stronger
manipulations of injunctive reaction can be produced to shift
children away from the preference to copy the majority, as found
in this experiment.
Another promising way to manipulate injunctive and descrip-
tive norms, given the methodological constraints outlined above,
would be to have one group establish a descriptive norm, by
performing one set of actions, and have a second group produce
an injunctive reaction towards a lone model performing a second
set of actions. While this would have the advantage of not creating
a situation where they group is approving of a behavior they are
not performing (or disapproving of a behavior they are perform-
ing), it introduces a further artificiality. Namely, how children will
interpret these two groups: whether they will see them as two sub-
groups or as two distinct groups which may have different norms
altogether. This further highlights the need for further experiments
to be run, and the difficulty in ruling-out all possible alternative
interpretations within in anyone design, in investigating the
interaction of descriptive and injunctive norms.
It is interesting to consider the current research in the light of a
recent experiment by Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse
[65]. They presented children with videos of models performing
an imitation task. Children either saw two videos of separate
models successively, performing the task identically, or a video of
the same model twice. They also had further conditions in which
children saw the two models performing the task synchronously
(this was further manipulated with children either seeing this video
twice or once). Before seeing these videos children listened to a
comment by the experimenter designed to frame the experience of
the child, either saying ‘‘she always does it his way’’ or ‘‘she always
gets the pegs up’’ (the aim of the task). The object of the
experiment was to examine if children would differentially
perceive tasks as purely instrumental or conventional; where
conventional tasks (like rituals) require exact copying of actions,
and instrumental tasks only require achieving the same outcome.
To this end, Herrmann and colleagues measured the imitation
fidelity of children and their explanations for their behavior. They
found that the framing drawing attention to the conventionality of
the actions ‘‘she always gets the pegs up’’ and the viewing of two
synchronous demonstrations of adults promoted high-fidelity and
more conventional-based explanations about the actions children
chose to perform. These results add a further layer of complexity
to majority influence and conformity research, as they suggest
simply witnessing the actions of multiple adults performing a
behavior may change the child’s interpretation of what their
imitative goals are within the experiment. Designs such as the one
employed here may find children copy the majority’s actions more
closely (having higher imitation fidelity), because they interpret
these actions as conventional. This may be especially so in the
current experiment, where the majority’s actions contained
irrelevant actions, perhaps earmarking them as conventional.
In conclusion, children’s ability to use social information in
directing their behavior is key to their survival and development.
However, this social information comes in several forms that may
vary in their reliability and in the contexts in which they are most
adaptive (see [66] [67]). The current experiment shows, at least in
terms of incidental observations of social interaction, children
prefer to conform rather than base their behavior on the injunctive
reactions of models. Furthermore by examining how two differing
sources of information interact, the current experiment also
represents a more ecologically valid experimental approach which
will become increasingly necessary if our understanding of the
basic forces which drive social learning is to advance.
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